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The assigned topic for the symposium of which this essay is an
outgrowth was "What Change May Come: The Obama Administration
and the Future of the Administrative State." "Change" was, of course, a
prominent theme in Barack Obama's campaign for the presidency, and
the advent of his Administration has indeed brought new goals and poli-
cies to the fore, although the pace of change has undoubtedly not been as
rapid as many supporters had hoped.
I interpret the theme of the symposium as an invitation to explore
how administrative law can facilitate or retard the capacity of a presi-
dential administration to implement policies of a kind that it was elected
to promote. More specifically, I intend to devote this essay to an exami-
nation of the role of judicial review. How might the courts influence the
ability of an incoming administration to pursue an agenda for change?
And how should they exercise this influence? The discussion will center
on the implications of the Supreme Court's recent decision in FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc.' The basic argument of the essay is that
Fox will at least slightly broaden the capacity of an administration to
pursue an agenda of change and that this development is, on the whole,
salutary.
This focus comes naturally to me in the sense that judicial review
has been the subject of much of my past scholarship. In this particular
context, however, it presents some difficulties. The courts are, after all,
supposed to be independent. Judges are not supposed to have an agenda
to promote or impede the administration's policies (as distinguished
from promoting Congress's). Even if we believe that some judges do
covertly possess such an agenda, they aren't likely to disclose it to us.
The upshot is that, although the courts affect the administrative process
enormously, they also do so obliquely. We need to pay attention to their
impact, but we have to tease out their contributions through inferenceas
best we can.
A related, but more classically academic, purpose of the essay is to
* William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law, Washington University in St.
Louis.
1. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
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explore certain aspects of the doctrines that govern judicial review of
agency discretion. In the language of the Administrative Procedure Act,
the inquiry relates to review for "arbitrary" or "capricious" action, or
"abuse of discretion," 2 but the more popular name for this mode of
review is the "hard look" doctrine. For present purposes, all of these
terms are interchangeable. Arbitrariness review has gotten relatively lit-
tle attention during the past two decades or so, because both courts and
commentators have devoted themselves instead to exploring, somewhat
obsessively, the intricacies of judicial review of issues of law rather than
discretion, primarily through elaboration of the so-called Chevron doc-
trine and its various exceptions.' However, recent judicial and scholarly
treatments of arbitrariness doctrine invite renewed attention to that phase
of judicial review.
In undertaking to write about doctrine-specifically, judicial
review doctrine that may affect the ability of a new presidential adminis-
tration to effectuate policy change-I do not overlook the recent profu-
sion of empirical literature suggesting that judges' political ideology can
go far to explain why court challenges to agency action come out as they
do.4 These studies tell us that doctrine isn't the whole story, but I will
proceed on the premise that it is part of the story. After all, most of the
huge literature on Chevron makes the same working assumption. I'll
return to this question of the relevancy of doctrine, when seen against
the background of the empirical literature, at the end of this essay.
II. Fox AND POLICY CHANGE
The Fox case grew out of a ruling by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) that a television or radio station can be found liable
for "indecency," and potentially be subject to heavy fines, if it broad-
casts a program on which someone uses what the Court delicately called
"the F-Word," even in a fleeting and unplanned way.' The specific liti-
gation arose out of Fox's broadcast of a Golden Globes award ceremony
in which Cher said this about receiving her award: "I've also had critics
for the last 40 years saying that I was on my way out every year. Right.
So f*** 'em."6 Similarly, on another Golden Globes broadcast, Nicole
2. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
3. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083 (2008); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review,
75 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (2008); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 823 (2006).
5. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1807.
6. Id. at 1808.
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Richie was describing the rural life depicted on her reality show, "The
Simple Life," and asked: "Have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a
Prada purse? It's not so f***ing simple."7 The FCC found that these
broadcasts violated the prohibition of "indecent" language in the Com-
munications Act,' although it let Fox off without a monetary penalty this
time. 9
In adopting this ruling, the FCC was departing from a policy that it
had followed for some thirty years. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,o the
Supreme Court had upheld the Communications Act ban on "indecent"
speech as applied to a radio station that had broadcast George Carlin's
expletive-laden Filthy Words monologue. For years afterwards, the FCC
described its enforcement policy in this area as applicable only to broad-
casts that, like the Carlin monologue, involved repeated use of graphic
language for shock value. Programs that contained fleeting, isolated
expletives were uniformly tolerated."1 The Fox proceeding was one of a
series of cases in which, beginning in 2004, the FCC took a significantly
stricter view. 12
The Second Circuit reversed the Commission and, in doing so, held
that this change of direction put a special burden of explanation on the
agency. 13 The court said that the FCC decision could not be sustained
unless the agency explained "'why the original reasons for adopting the
[former] rule or policy are no longer dispositive,'" and also "'why the
new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the old rule.' "14
Without such an explanation, the Commission's finding would be arbi-
trary and capricious.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court by a 5-4 vote and
upheld the FCC order under review.15 In his majority opinion, Justice
Scalia specifically disagreed with the Second Circuit's position regard-
ing the extent to which an agency must explain a change in prior pol-
icy.16 He agreed that the Commission's action would have been arbitrary
if it had departed from prior policy without acknowledging that it was
7. Id.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).
9. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1810.
10. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
11. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1806-07.
12. Id. at 1807-10.
13. Id. at 1810.
14. Id. (quoting Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 456-57 (2d Cir. 2007),
rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)).
15. Id. at 1819.
16. Id. at 1810.
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doing so, or without explaining why it favored the new policy." But, he
said, the agency
need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons for the
new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that
the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good
reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the
conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that the
agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than
what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate."
The following pages will be devoted to exploring and evaluating
the Court's position on this issue. This will by no means be a compre-
hensive analysis of the Fox case. The Court also addressed a variety of
other aspects of arbitrariness review, and five other Justices filed con-
curring or dissenting opinions that contributed further to the overall dia-
logue.19 I will, however, discuss these additional aspects of the case only
insofar as they bear on the main theme.
Ultimately, the Court remanded the case to the Second Circuit for
consideration of constitutional issues, which it had not examined on this
appeal.2 0 About a year later, the court of appeals held that the FCC's
new policy on fleeting expletives was too vague to survive scrutiny
under the First Amendment.2 1 Fox and its allies in the broadcast industry
have, therefore, apparently prevailed in the fight over fleeting expletives,
at least for the present. The Supreme Court's administrative law teach-
ings, however, promise to be more enduring and deserve careful
analysis.
III. THE MAJORITY'S RATIONALE
A. Antecedents
Whatever else may be said about it, the majority's rationale was a
new wrinkle in scope-of-review doctrine. The Second Circuit's view
was typical of the teachings of other lower court opinions prior to Fox.
17. Id. at 1811.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 1819-22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (joining the majority but adding that he
would be willing to reconsider, inter alia, Pacifica in a proper case); id. at 1822-24 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (joining most of the majority opinion and
articulating a position similar to the majority's on the issue of review of policy changes); id. at
1824-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FCC's policy change was arbitrary and that the
Commission had read Pacifica too broadly); id. at 1828-29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(highlighting the "long shadow the First Amendment casts over what the Commission has done");
id. at 1829-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing at length that the FCC order was arbitrary and
capricious).
20. Id. at 1819 (majority opinion).
21. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 2010).
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The general assumption was that when an agency departs from past poli-
cies, a reviewing court should expect it not only to acknowledge the
departure, but also to give a good reason for it.2 2 This proposition also
seemed to find support in some of the Supreme Court's own past pro-
nouncements, notably including this frequently quoted language from
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade:2 3
"There is ... at least a presumption that [congressional] policies will be
carried out best if [a] settled rule is adhered to. From this presumption
flows the agency's duty to explain its departure from prior norms."24 In
Fox, however, Justice Scalia appeared to regard the Atchison "presump-
tion" as imposing on the agency only a burden "to provide some expla-
nation for a change."25
Justice Scalia's refusal to interpret this duty of explanation expan-
sively should not have surprised anyone. He had made his views clear in
a well-known lecture on the Chevron doctrine that he had published
more than a decade prior to Fox:
If Congress is to delegate broadly, as modem times are thought to
demand, it seems to me desirable that the delegee be able to suit its
actions to the times, and that continuing political accountability be
assured, through direct political pressures upon the Executive and
through the indirect political pressure of congressional oversight. All
this is lost if "new" or "changing" agency interpretations are some-
how suspect. There are of course well established restrictions upon
sudden and irrational changes of interpretation through adjudication,
and statutorily prescribed procedures (including a requirement of rea-
soned justification) for changes of interpretation through rulemaking.
And at some point, I suppose, repeated changes back and forth may
rise (or descend) to the level of "arbitrary and capricious," and thus
unlawful, agency action. But so long as these limitations are com-
plied with, there seems to me no reason to value a new interpretation
less than an old one. 26
The Fox case provided Scalia an opportunity to prevail on his col-
22. Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice, Am. Bar Ass'n, A Blackletter Statement of
Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 42-43 (2002) [hereinafter ABA Blackletter
Statement] ("Commonly applied bases for reversal [under the arbitrary and capricious test] include
... [a showing that an agency] action is, without legitimate reason and adequate explanation,
inconsistent with prior agency policies or precedents."). The accompanying report collected case
law support for this claim. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review ofAgency Discretion, in A
GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLmcAL REvIEw OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 177, 189-90 (John F. Duffy &
Michael Herz eds., 2005).
23. 412 U.S. 800 (1973).
24. Id. at 808.
25. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1810 n.2.
26. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 518 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
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leagues-or at least enough of them to compose a majority-to embrace
this more accommodating attitude toward agencies' changing their
minds.
The Fox holding was also foreshadowed by the Court's 2006 deci-
sion in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Services.27 There, in another FCC case, the Court held that when an
agency adopts one interpretation of an ambiguous regulatory statute and
the interpretation is judicially upheld, the agency remains free to adopt a
different interpretation later, if the second interpretation would other-
wise be entitled to Chevron deference.28 The fact that the first interpreta-
tion had been upheld in court does not prevent the agency from changing
its mind. 29 The Brand X holding did not completely predetermine the
Fox analysis, because in Fox the issue was what kind of explanation
must accompany a revised interpretation, not whether the agency was
barred "as a matter of law" from altering its past policy at all. In a
broader sense, however, the thrust of both cases was similar: The agency
should be free to revise its position without being unduly impeded by
either judicial precedent (Brand X) or the agency's own prior views
(Fox).
To be sure, the Scalia lecture and the Brand X opinion were written
about Chevron and phrased in the language of statutory interpretation. I
have argued in past scholarship that the second step in the Chevron
formula overlaps, if it does not entirely coincide with, the arbitrary-
capricious standard of review,3 0 and this view is now widely accepted.31
In other words, Chevron asks whether an agency's "interpretation" con-
flicts with the unambiguous meaning of a statute and, if not, whether it
is reasonable; but in practice this "reasonableness" inquiry is primarily
an inquiry into whether the interpretation is "reasoned," which is the
27. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). For a pre-Brand X defense of the conclusions the Court later
reached, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1272 (2002).
28. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981-82.
29. Id. The Court said that the ruling in the first case binds the agency "only if the prior court
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion." Id. at 982. Under those circumstances, the agency would
not have been entitled to Chevron deference in the first place. Thus, the effect of Brand X is to
make any judicial deference to the agency that may have occurred in the first case irrelevant as a
brake on Chevron deference in the second case.
30. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1253 (1997).
31. ABA Blackletter Statement, supra note 22, at 38. For recent discussions to similar effect,
see, for example, Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 96-97 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Matthew C. Stephenson &
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REv. 597 (2009). But see Kenneth A.
Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron's Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REv. 611 (2009) (suggesting
qualifications to the Stephenson and Vermeule account).
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traditional basis of arbitrariness review.32 The overlap between these
two nominally discrete standards of review suggests that the ground
rules operating under them should be roughly similar.
B. Normative Considerations
Regardless of how one reads the antecedents that arguably militated
in favor of or against the Court's holding in Fox, I believe that much can
be said in support of the Court's relatively receptive attitude toward pol-
icy changes at the administrative level. The most salient argument tend-
ing in that direction proceeds from the premise that elections should
have consequences. The best-known articulation of this proposition in
the administrative law literature is Justice Rehnquist's partial dissent in
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.33 Rehnquist would have upheld the rescission by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) of a rule that
required automobile manufacturers to install automatic seatbelts in all
new cars. He added that the rescission appeared to be related to Ronald
Reagan's election as President and that "[a] change in administration
brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable
basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of
its programs and regulations.
Applying the logic of Rehnquist's argument to the facts of Fox, one
can argue that if the people elect George W. Bush to be President (how-
ever contested that particular election may have been), they are to some
extent inviting, and should expect to get, the kinds of policy changes
that would naturally be pursued by the kind of people whom President
Bush would appoint." But at the same time, this stance is also condu-
32. Levin, supra note 30, at 1263-77.
33. 463 U.S. 29, 57-59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. Id. at 59.
35. This line of reasoning may seem shaky, if not entirely flawed, because the FCC is an
"independent" agency, which is subject to less control over time by the president than an
"executive" agency is. Indeed, that distinction gave rise to debate in Fox. Justices Breyer and
Stevens, in dissent, suggested that, because of the FCC's status as an independent agency, it
should be relatively apolitical, and courts should hold it to an exceptionally high standard of
reasoned decisionmaking. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1824-26 (2009)
(Stevens, J, dissenting); id. at 1829-30 (Breyer, J, dissenting.). Justice Scalia (speaking for four
Justices in a portion of his opinion that Justice Kennedy did not join) rejected this reasoning,
remarking that the "independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President,
and it has often been observed that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has
simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction." Id. at 1815-17
(plurality opinion). For a review of this aspect of the case, and an argument that independent
agencies should indeed receive less judicial deference than executive agencies do, see Randolph J.
May, Defining Deference Down, Again: Independent Agencies, Chevron Deference, and Fox, 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 433 (2010).
I do not feel obliged to enter into this debate. Apparently, no court has ever embraced this
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cive to allowing an incoming administration like President Obama's to
institute policies with which it is more comfortable. The logic of the Fox
case suggests that, if the Obama Administration appoints commissioners
who are less worried about expletives on the airwaves than the FCC of
2006 was, the pendulum could well swing back in the opposite direction.
From this standpoint, the thrust of the Fox principle is, at least in this
respect, neither regulatory nor deregulatory. Rather, it serves to reduce
the inertia of regulatory policies. In a quite straightforward sense, this
holding could be expected, over time, to buttress the capacity of an
incoming presidential administration to pursue an agenda for change.
Professor Kathryn Watts elaborates on this theme in a recent article
entitled Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review.3 6 As the title suggests, she takes up the challenge of asking
whether and how judicial review doctrine could be reformulated so as to
give agencies an enhanced opportunity to pursue political priorities. She
calls attention to the fact that Chevron expressly argues for judicial def-
erence to administrative authorities on the basis that they are politically
accountable for their decisions, and judges are not; and that understand-
ing of the rationale for the doctrine has become widely accepted." So,
Watts argues, it is curious that this same line of reasoning has been
much less prominent in discussions of hard look review, which is more
often regarded as a largely technocratic, apolitical mode of review. Rec-
ognition of a "place for politics" in arbitrariness review would alleviate
this disparity." Given my view that Chevron and arbitrariness review
overlap in significant ways, as discussed above, I naturally find this nor-
mative argument congenial.
Actually, the latitude that might ensue from a comparatively
relaxed approach to arbitrariness review can serve other ends besides the
facilitation of political agendas. It might, for example, serve to amelio-
rate what has come to be known as the "ossification" of the rulemaking
process, as Professor Watts also recognizes. 9 The ossification concept
distinction, see Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1817 ("Nor does any case of ours express or reflect . . .
'heightened scrutiny' [for rulemaking by independent agencies]"); May, supra, at 436, although
the Court's newest member has suggested that she might favor it. See Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376-77 (2001). For the present, the legal system seems
content to proceed without it, presumably in the belief that the similarities between executive and
independent agencies, including the susceptibility of the latter to some political control, are
sufficient to outweigh their differences.
36. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009).
37. Id. at 35-38.
38. Id. at 39. For another recent, probing inquiry into the proper role of political influences in
the regulatory process, see Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency
Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1127 (2010).
39. Watts, supra note 36, at 41-42.
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refers to the possibility that the burdens of preparing detailed explana-
tory preambles to accompany rules, due to the expectations of reviewing
courts (among others), causes agencies to shy away from resorting to the
rulemaking process as readily as they should.' Ossification is not
directly relevant to the Fox case, which, after all, grew out of agency
adjudication, not rulemaking. On a broader level, however, impediments
to policy change at the administrative level have been criticized for
many years, outside the rulemaking context as well as within it. This
more global critique is reflected in now-Justice Elena Kagan's article
Presidential Administration, which notes that "bureaucracy . . . has
inherent vices (even pathologies), foremost among which are inertia and
torpor. The standard rhetoric of administrative law, which talks of the
need to control agency action, obscures this danger."4 1 Justice Kagan's
proposed solution in her article-a statutory presumption whereby a
grant of authority to an executive officer should be construed as permit-
ting the president to direct that officer to make a particular decision,
unless the statute expressly specifies otherwise 4 2-has not yet gained
traction in real-world practice. It seems evident, however, that an adjust-
ment in the standard of review by which policy changes are judged in
court could be responsive to this critique.
IV. POSSIBLE DOUBTS AND QUALIFICATIONS
Thus far, however, my argument in support of the Fox opinion's
lenient attitude toward policy change is entirely one-sided. At most, it is
a prima facie case. To consider more seriously whether that position was
well taken, I will need to juxtapose it with what the dissenters said on
the same issue. Justice Breyer wrote the principal dissent and offered a
contrasting perspective on this issue. He said:
To explain a change requires more than setting forth reasons why the
new policy is a good one. It also requires the agency to answer the
question, "Why did you change?" And a rational answer to this ques-
tion typically requires a more complete explanation than would prove
satisfactory were change itself not at issue.43
He drove this argument home in his discussion of the substantive argu-
40. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V?: A Response
to Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 909-10 (2007); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1410-26 (1992).
For a more skeptical perspective, see William S. Jordan, HI, Ossification Revisited: Does
Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve
Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U.L. REV. 393, 403-07 (2000).
41. Kagan, supra note 35, at 2263.
42. Id. at 2320, 2327.
43. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1830 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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ments that the FCC used to justify its new fleeting expletives policy. For
example, he acknowledged the FCC's argument that "the expletives here
in question always evoke a coarse excretory or sexual image," but
replied that "[t]he problem with this answer is that it does not help to
justify the change in policy. The FCC was aware of the coarseness of the
'image' the first time around."" Similarly, noting the Commission's
finding that "the new policy was better in part because . . . [it] better
protects children against what it described as 'the first blow"' (an unan-
ticipated expletive), he responded that "[t]he difficulty with this argu-
ment . .. is that it does not explain the change."" The FCC had long
considered the "first blow" theory to be compatible with its previous
enforcement policy, in which fleeting expletives had been tolerated. Jus-
tice Breyer thus asked: "What, in respect to the 'first blow,' has
changed?"4 6
Breyer declared that he was not proposing a "heightened" standard
of review, but rather an "application of the same standard of review"-
the arbitrariness test-"to different circumstances . . . . It requires the
agency to focus upon the fact of change where change is relevant, just as
it must focus upon any other relevant circumstance."47 This formulation
is helpful insofar as it dispensed with the somewhat elusive notion of a
heightened standard, but it leads directly to the challenge of identifying
circumstances in which change would be relevant and the reasons that
would make it relevant.
A. Where the Majority and Dissenters Agreed
Up to a point, the Justices were in agreement about circumstances
in which a policy change would have to be explained carefully, and I
will try to highlight these areas before turning to their disagreements.
Justice Scalia noted that an agency must explain a change in direction if
"its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which
underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious
reliance interests that must be taken into account. It would be arbitrary
44. Id. at 1838.
45. Id. at 1839 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Commission was referring to language
from FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978): "To say that one may avoid
further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow."
46. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1831. The notion of a "heightened standard" entered into the discussion because
some pre-Fox case law in the lower courts had suggested that such a standard of review comes
into play when an agency changes course. See, e.g., NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 998 (D.C. Cir.




and capricious to ignore such matters." 8 Justice Kennedy, in a concur-
ring opinion, agreed that the need to explain a change in policy would
depend on the circumstances and that an agency would need to do so
under the circumstances that Scalia had mentioned.49
The Justices in the majority had little choice but to concede that it
would be arbitrary for an agency to base a change in policy on factual
premises that contradicted findings that it had used to support its prior
policy. As Kennedy recognized, they otherwise would have had trouble
explaining away the holding in State Farm.5 o In that case NHTSA ini-
tially had adopted a rule that required car manufacturers to install auto-
matic seatbelts or airbags in new motor vehicles." Upon determining
that the benefits of the seatbelt option did not justify its costs, the depart-
ment rescinded the entire rule.52 The Court held that the rescission had
been arbitrary because the department had not even attempted to explain
why it had eliminated the airbags portion of the prior rule." This omis-
sion was erroneous, the Court said pointedly, "[g]iven the effectiveness
[previously] ascribed to airbag technology by the agency . .. ."54 Simi-
larly, NHTSA had rejected the option of requiring manufacturers to
install non-detachable seatbelts because they would "complicate the
extrication of [an] occupant from his or her car."" The Court found that
this conclusion was also arbitrary, in part because the agency did not
explain why it had changed its mind after concluding three years earlier
that such belts allowed easy extricability. 6 On both of these issues, the
Court in State Farm was unanimous."
Seen in this light, one lesson that seems to emerge from Fox is that
when courts evaluate the rationality of an agency's change in policy, the
nature of the agency's explanation for its decision can be crucial. If the
agency chooses to adopt (or the underlying statute requires it to adopt) a
factually grounded explanation for a rule or policy, a contradiction
between the agency's previous and current view of the facts would cry
out for explanation. However, the majority and concurrence seem to
48. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1811 (citing Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735,
742 (1996)).
49. Id. at 1822-24 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
50. Id. at 1824.
51. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1983).
52. Id. at 38.
53. Id. at 46-51.
54. Id. at 46.
55. Id. at 56 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. at 55-56.
57. Despite his partial dissent, see id. at 57-59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority's decision with respect to these
regulatory options. Id. at 57-58.
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maintain, if the agency changes its policy for reasons that could be better
described as a value judgment (and the enabling statute permits it to do
so), the same logic does not come into play, and the agency has less
need to make a direct comparison between the old and new policy.58
Another of Justice Scalia's off-the-bench writings provides a tangi-
ble illustration of this distinction, building on the facts of State Farm. In
the actual case, as already noted, the Court overturned NHTSA's passive
restraints rule. This decision affirmed a D.C. Circuit decision to similar
effect.59 The agency's failure to explain its abandonment of the airbags
option, described above, was one basis for this holding.6 0 Another was
that NHTSA's prediction of the inefficacy of automatic seatbelts rested
on inadequate analysis (specifically, it did not take enough account of
the fact that the belts would automatically operate unless the consumer
took affirmative steps to disable them). 1 In a commentary on the court
of appeals' decision, then-Professor Scalia suggested that a less techno-
cratic explanation could simplify the agency's burden of explanation by
adopting a more openly normative (and in a sense political) justification:
More needs to be done to bring the political, accommodationist,
value-judgment aspect of rulemaking out of the closet. When
NHTSA comes to reconsider the passive-restraint rule recently
remanded by the D.C. Circuit, and if it chooses to adhere to its prior
course, it would be refreshing and instructive if, instead of (or at least
in addition to) blowing smoke in our eyes with exhaustive technical
and economic data, it said flat-out: "It is our judgment that people
should not be strapped in cars if they don't want to be; nor should
they have to spend substantial sums for air-bags if they choose other-
wise." A political judgment, the retribution or reward for which will
be meted out by Congress, or at the polls, but not in the courts.62
The distinction that I am extracting from this hypothetical is not clear-
cut. Naturally, even the fictional explanation that Scalia envisioned
would have required some factual support, policy discussion, and
response to public comments. But the basic lesson remains: A decision
based squarely on an explicit (and statutorily authorized) value judgment
would probably require less explanation than a more technocratic
rationale.
The second situation mentioned by Scalia and Kennedy as calling
for explanation of a policy change would be one in which reliance inter-
58. Justice Kennedy made this point particularly explicit in his separate opinion. FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823-24 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
59. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
60. Id. at 230.
61. Id.
62. Antonin Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. v, xi (1982).
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ests were seriously implicated. This also was an unsurprising assertion,
because ample case law, in both the Supreme Court and lower courts,
has established that an agency that departs from its past practices may be
held to have acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner if the unfairness
to regulated persons outweighs the government's interest in applying its
new view to those persons. 63 From this premise one can easily conclude
that if an agency does propose to alter a policy on which private persons
have reasonably relied, it will need to set forth a cogent explanation for
that choice. The FCC's decision not to impose any monetary penalty on
Fox Television, notwithstanding its finding that the network had vio-
lated the Communications Act," indicated plainly that the Commission
had internalized the teachings of these cases.
This case law would seem to provide an appropriate lens through
which to consider a hypothetical that Justice Breyer used to illustrate his
thesis that agencies must explain why they change their policies:
An (imaginary) administrator explaining why he chose a policy that
requires driving on the right-side, rather than the left-side, of the road
might say, "Well, one side seemed as good as the other, so I flipped a
coin." But even assuming the rationality of that explanation for an
initial choice, that explanation is not at all rational if offered to
explain why the administrator changed driving practice, from right-
side to left-side, 25 years later.65
Surely, that explanation would be arbitrary and capricious.66 However,
the problem in Breyer's hypothetical case would grow primarily out of
impaired reliance interests. Drivers, pedestrians, manufacturers, and
highway officials would have reasonably made investments and devel-
oped habits based on the right-side system. Factors like these had noth-
ing to do with the problem in Fox, because transition costs resulting
from reliance on the former fleeting-expletives policy were not signifi-
cantly involved in that case.6 7
63. See, e.g., Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 n.12 (1984) ("[An
administrative agency may not apply a new [case-law] rule retroactively when to do so would
unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests."); Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941,
951 (9th Cir. 2007); Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Microcomputer Tech. Inst. v. Riley, 139 F.3d 1044, 1050 (5th Cir. 1998).
64. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009).
65. Id. at 1830-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66. An even more clear-cut example, however, would be the hypothetical scenario that I once
heard used to illustrate the hazards of gradualism: "The British government announced today that
the nation will switch from driving on the left side to driving on the right. To minimize disruption,
however, the change will be phased in. In year one, only the trucks will move."
67. Justice Breyer did draw attention to the risk that the new policy would force small
broadcasters to have to invest in expensive bleeping-out equipment, id. at 1835-37, but that
objection related to forward-looking compliance costs rather than the risk that broadcasters would
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B. The Nub of the Disagreement
Now that I have examined areas in which the majority and dissent-
ers seemed to be in accord as to the need for explanation of a policy
change, I can home in on the areas of disagreement. Justice Breyer con-
tended that, to justify a new policy, an agency must not only acknowl-
edge that it is doing something different, but also make a direct
comparison between the two policies. Thus:
the agency must explain why it has come to the conclusion that it
should now change direction. Why does it now reject the considera-
tions that led it to adopt that initial policy? What has changed in the
world that offers justification for the change? What other good rea-
sons are there for departing from the earlier policy?68
This formulation seems much more expansive than that of Justices
Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Breyer's reasons for endorsing it are not
spelled out, however. He agrees that sometimes the only explanation is
that "[w]e . . . weigh the . . . considerations differently."6 9 So the ques-
tion is: Under what circumstances, other than those acknowledged by
the majority, would this explanation be inadequate? His opinion offers
scant generalizable criteria.
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, was no less emphatic: "There
should be a strong presumption that the FCC's initial views, reflecting
the informed judgment of independent commissioners with expertise in
the regulated area, also reflect the views of the Congress that delegated
the Commission authority to flesh out details not fully defined in the
enacting statute." 0 This declaration is also difficult to interpret. It would
be hard to defend this "strong presumption" on a literal level, because it
does not seem likely that the FCC of 1978 and 1985 understood the
position of the 1934 Congress better than the FCC of 2004 did. Perhaps,
therefore, it rests on a broader notion that initial interpretations or policy
judgments tend to be relatively reliable, and departures from these inter-
pretations should be somewhat suspect or mistrusted. Like Breyer, Jus-
tice Stevens would in effect read the "presumption" in Atchison broadly.
However, his reasons for doing so are again somewhat obscure.
In one additional passage, Justice Stevens did approach the issue a
bit more concretely by referring briefly to the broadcasters' "substantial
interest in regulatory stability."" In concept, that interest could logically
be penalized for past investment decisions if they failed to comply quickly enough with the new
regime.
68. Id. at 1831.
69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).




provide some support for a definition of arbitrariness that would make
policy changes relatively difficult to institute. However, that argument
would appear to prove too much. Stability and innovation are both
important to the sound development of a regulatory program. Indeed,
Justice Stevens himself argued eloquently on other occasions that the
Communications Act and other regulatory statutes should be construed
flexibly to allow the responsible agency to revise its policies in order to
adapt to changes in society.7 2
In the judicial context, of course, stare decisis is considered a
strong norm, and departures from precedent are thought to call for "spe-
cial justification."7 One would expect a court to explain cogently, not
just perfunctorily, what is wrong with one of its own precedents before
abandoning it; an explanation of why the new holding is defensible on
its own terms would obviously not suffice. It is possible that the Fox
dissenters' attitude toward changes in agency policy was influenced to
some degree by the way they would view a court's departure from pre-
cedent.7 4 However, judicial and administrative stare decisis are not
equivalent. Stare decisis in the judicial sphere is closely bound up with
the aspiration (or if you prefer, the myth) of the rule of law. Agencies,
however, act in a quasi-legislative capacity as acknowledged policymak-
ers, and the issues of legitimacy that arise when they jettison a precedent
are simply not the same. Justice Scalia's lecture on Chevron is again
instructive:
It has always seemed to me utterly unrealistic to believe that when an
agency revises . .. one of the legal rules that it applies in its adjudica-
tions . . . the agency was admitting that it had "got the law wrong."
And it has thus seemed to me inappropriate to look askance at such
changes .... Rather, the agency was simply "changing the law," in
72. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. 512 U.S. 218,235 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 151-52 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); Arizona v. Ramsey, 467 U.S. 203,
212 (1984). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
Constitutional Methodology, 76 NYU L. REv. 570 (2001); Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Irrepressibility of Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1279 (2008); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as
Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 411 (2010).
74. Indeed, one could speculate that the debate over policy change in Fox served as
something of a proxy for a larger tension within the Court itself over stare decisis. In strong
dissents, Breyer and Stevens have made no secret about their discontent with what they regard as
their colleagues' abandonment of longstanding constitutional precedents in a wide variety of
contexts. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 938-42 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 866 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). They have made this reaction even clearer in less formal
interviews and comments. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 334-36 (2007) (Breyer); Jeffrey Rosen,
The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html (Stevens).
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light of new information or even new social attitudes impressed upon
it through the political process-all within the limited range of dis-
cretion to "change the law" conferred by the governing statute.
A scope-of-review formula that defines the constraining force of admin-
istrative stare decisis should, therefore, rest on an analysis that is distinc-
tive to the administrative process. In those terms, the Fox dissenters'
theory seems to have swept more broadly than their arguments could
sustain.
C. A Few Kind Words Regarding Hard Look Review
The analysis that I have developed in the preceding pages is a lim-
ited one, and I do not want it to be over-read. I have addressed a rela-
tively narrow question regarding the circumstances under which one line
of inquiry should remain in the judge's (and, therefore, the litigant's)
toolbox as a basis for challenging agency actions. I do not, however,
intend the essay as an assault on the role that arbitrariness review gener-
ally plays in forcing agencies to defend and be accountable for their
policy positions in light of statutory mandates, a factual record, and the
arguments tendered by contesting parties. That judicial function remains
pertinent regardless of whether or not an agency action can be seen as
emanating from a political mandate or agenda. Even where a statute
does permit an agency to base a particular decision on politically
charged value judgments, judicial review can serve the beneficial pur-
pose of forcing the agency to acknowledge its reliance on those judg-
ments. By operating to debunk the neutral-sounding but insupportable
explanations that agencies sometimes advance in order to conceal politi-
cally charged value judgments, judicial review can directly promote
political accountability.
Some leading examples of this dynamic are familiar enough that
they need little elaboration. For instance, I have drawn attention above
to Justice Rehnquist's argument, in his separate opinion in State Farm,
that an incoming administration has legitimate reason to reappraise
agency policies in light of its governing philosophy.76 That argument
75. See Scalia, supra note 26, at 518-19; see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S.
759, 766 (1969) (plurality opinion) (noting the "qualified role of stare decisis in the administrative
process"). An emerging principle in civil litigation is that when a court overrules prior precedent,
it must apply the new precedent to cases that arose before the new decision, at least if it also
applies the new precedent to the litigation in which it was announced. The applicability of this
principle to agencies is dubious for essentially the same reasons discussed in the text, i.e., because
stare decisis principles have less force in the administrative sphere than in the judicial sphere, and
the agencies' "legislative" role is implicated. See Laborers' Int'l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp.,
26 F.3d 375, 385-89 (3d Cir. 1994); Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea: Judicial Remedies and
Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DuKE L.J. 291, 358 n.304 (2003).
76. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57-59 (1983)
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has inherent appeal, but it has to be balanced off against the basic mes-
sage of the State Farm majority opinion, namely that an electoral man-
date does not entitle an agency to adopt or rescind a rule on the basis of
a superficial analysis.77 The most prominent example in our own day is
the Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, better known as the
global-warming case. The Court there set aside the Bush Administra-
tion's refusal to commence a rulemaking proceeding to regulate green-
house gas emissions from motor vehicles. 79 The government defended
its decision as an outgrowth of the President's political strategy, which
emphasized voluntary programs and negotiations with foreign nations,
but the Court concluded that this course of action did not rest on the
predicate findings contemplated by the Clean Air Act.s0 The Act, in the
Court's view, required the agency to select its program after making a
"judgment" as to whether greenhouse gases endangered the environ-
ment." EPA had bypassed making this finding, and the Court admon-
ished it that "the use of the word 'judgment' is not a roving license to
ignore the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise discretion within
defined statutory limits."8 2 At this level of generality, this standard lore
is not in tension with the essay's argument.
Furthermore, despite my defense of the Court's position on the
issue of explaining policy changes in Fox, I do not mean to endorse the
majority opinion in all respects. Aside from the First Amendment
problems with the FCC's decision, which led to its invalidation when
the case was remanded, some aspects of the Court's analysis seem
decidedly vulnerable to criticism on administrative law grounds. For one
thing, the court of appeals had argued that the question of whether the
FCC order was arbitrary and capricious should be analyzed with special
solicitude for the First Amendment interests at stake. 84 The Supreme
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), discussed supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
77. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51-55 (majority opinion) (finding that NHTSA's dismissal of
the safety benefits of detachable automatic seatbelts did not take account of the fact that the belts
would continue to function automatically unless consumers took the affirmative step of
disconnecting them).
78. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
79. Id. at 534-35.
80. Id. 533.
81. Id. at 532-33.
82. Id. at 533. See generally Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SuP. CT. Rev. 51 (2008) (analyzing the decision as subordinating
political choice to agency expertise).
83. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 2010), discussed supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
84. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct.
1800 (2009).
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Court responded that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance applies
only to statutory interpretation, and there was no precedent for applying
it to questions of whether the agency had abused its discretion." This
distinction seems artificial, particularly in light of the overlap between
statutory interpretation and policy formation. If the Court had framed the
issue in Fox as a matter of determining whether the word "indecency" in
the Communications Act could be "interpreted" to apply to fleeting
expletives, constitutional avoidance would presumably have been a fac-
tor to consider, although not necessarily dispositive. One would suppose,
therefore, that avoidance should also be implicated (though again not
necessarily dispositive) where the parties have chosen, as they did in the
real case, to frame their contentions as going to whether the agency's
order was arbitrary and capricious. At least the Court should have
explained the basis for this distinction, and it did not even try. To my
mind this was one of the least convincing links in the Court's train of
reasoning-a submission to the tyranny of labels."
The Court also could have responded more skeptically to the FCC's
contention8 7 that toleration of fleeting expletives on the airwaves would
have harmful effects on children. Justice Scalia argued that, although the
record did not contain quantitative proof of this causal relationship, the
Court had not required the Commission to produce specific proof in
Pacifica, and there was no reason to demand more here." One might
well consider this argument a weak response to the lower court's obser-
vation that evidence "that this harm is serious enough to warrant govern-
ment regulation ... would seem to be particularly relevant today when
children likely hear this language far more often from other sources than
they did in the 1970s when the Commission first began sanctioning
indecent speech." 8 9
These debatable aspects of the Court's opinion-among others that
could be mentioned-correspond to reasons why the Court could credi-
bly have invalidated the Commission's order even if there had been no
contrary prior FCC policy. On the issue of policy change as such, how-
ever, the Court's analysis seems persuasive. In the long run, the Fox
opinion will benefit both incoming Republican and Democratic adminis-
85. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811-12 (2009).
86. Professor Metzger has advanced a more ambitious and fundamental critique. She argues
that administrative law has long been, and should be, infused with constitutional values. Thus, she
maintains, the courts ought to acknowledge this interplay, and Fox erred in denying it. Gillian E.
Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479,
483-86, 519-25 (2010).
87. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1809.
88. Id. at 1813-14.
89. Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 461.
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trations. The Roberts Court majority had to know, however, that a Dem-
ocratic administration would be the beneficiary of its forthright position
in the short run. It seems to have risen above politics at least to that
extent.
V. CONCLUSION: DOES ANY OF THIS MATrER?
I have suggested here that the majority in Fox had the better of its
argument with the dissenters on the issue of whether an agency's policy
change should, as such, have to be accompanied by an analysis that
directly compares the merits of the new policy with the one it is replac-
ing. The Court's position on the issue comes down to this: Unless reli-
ance interests or inconsistent readings of a factual record are involved,
open acknowledgment of the change and a defense of the new policy on
its own terms should ordinarily suffice. This proposition can be under-
stood as, among other things, a means of enabling an incoming adminis-
tration-whether President Obama's or any other-to institute programs
and policies that can deliver on the promises of change that may have
propelled it into office. More broadly, this stance can be understood as
suggesting that judicial review has, at least sometimes, put an undue
emphasis on maintaining stability in particular regulatory environments.
The Court's relatively accommodating attitude toward agencies' rethink-
ing of their policies, even longstanding policies, may ultimately have
ripple effects in other contexts.o
To some readers, the doctrinal focus of this essay might be a sign of
its irrelevancy. As I mentioned in the introduction, an emerging body of
empirical scholarship casts doubt on the significance of many familiar
scope-of-review teachings.9 1 The research suggests that many judicial
decisions come out the same way regardless of which of various alterna-
tive standards of review the court applies (e.g., Chevron versus Skid-
90. One such ripple effect might be its potential implications for the doctrine of Alaska
Professional Hunters Ass'n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999). That case holds that, after an
agency has issued an interpretive rule construing a legislative regulation, it may not change that
interpretation by issuing a second interpretive rule; rather, it must resort to notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Id. at 1033-34. The doctrine has, on the whole, met with a hostile reaction from
administrative law scholars, who argue that if the first pronouncement was a valid interpretive
rule, logically the second one must be equally valid. See Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for
Administrative Common Law, 58 ADm.. L. REv. 917, 918-19, 927-28 (2006). After reviewing
and rejecting various possible justifications for this principle, Murphy suggests that it might be
defended as a means of making it relatively difficult for agencies to alter their interpretations
because they tend to undervalue the benefits of stability in regulatory matters. Id. at 930-37. Fox
casts substantial doubt on that premise. Notably, Murphy's explanation of why such a principle
might be desirable relies heavily on an analogy to judicial precedent-a comparison that I have
questioned above. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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more v. Swift & Co., 9 2 or substantial evidence versus arbitrariness). In a
recent article, Professor David Zaring reviewed these studies and con-
cluded that the familiar formulas should be replaced with the simpler
principle that a court should evaluate agency actions for "reasonable-
ness."" This step, he argues, would purge a good deal of mystification
from judicial opinions, with no actual loss in predictive power of the
doctrine. In another article, Professor Richard Pierce examines the same
studies and endorses Zaring's proposal, adding that political ideology
appears to have as much, if not more, influence on results than doctrine
does.94
I think it will be helpful here to distinguish between the "breadth"
and "depth" of the scope of judicial review. The "breadth" dimension
involves the question of what aspects of an administrative decision must
be weighed for their persuasiveness or reasonableness. For example,
conventional doctrine maintains that the agency must explain why its
action is reasonable in relation to the underlying statute, the facts in the
record, the arguments of participants in the proceeding, and-in at least
some sense-the agency's past policies and decisions. 95 The "depth"
dimension goes to the question of how reasonable these respective deter-
minations must be.
The findings discussed by Zaring and Pierce were basically con-
cerned with the depth dimension of judicial review, and their iconoclas-
tic project should be seen in that light. For present purposes, I do not
take issue with the empirical conclusions. The present essay, however,
relates only to the breadth dimension of judicial review. The doctrinal
problem that divided the Justices in Fox was to determine the circum-
stances under which an agency must reasonably explain why a new pol-
icy compares favorably with its former policy. This issue is logically
distinct from the question of whether, if the FCC had been required to
argue that its new policy on fleeting expletives was superior to the old
one, its position would have been "reasonable enough" to meet the arbi-
trariness standard (or any other).
I would argue in favor of the utility of doctrines that define the
92. 323 U.S. 134 (1944), See generally David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REv.
135 (2010).
93. See Zaring, supra note 92, at 186-97.
94. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Action Mean?
(George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 505, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1604701.
95. See ABA Blackletter Statement, supra note 22, at 42-43. For case-law support, see
Bressman, supra note 22, at 181-95. I have a more than casual interest in the ABA analysis and
the kind of research it represents, because I participated in its creation, and also because it was
largely based on an earlier project of mine. See Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine
Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMiN. L. REv. 239 (1986).
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breadth of review. Clarity about what bases the agency needs to have
touched should facilitate the courts' decisional process and enable
judges of differing professional and political backgrounds to reach
agreement more easily on the disposition of an appeal. This should tend
to dampen (but obviously not eliminate) the relative significance of ide-
ology in the process. Moreover, an appellate decision that is compatible
with the case law defining the proper breadth of judicial review will look
more legitimate to the public than one that is at odds with the case law."
Litigants need to know what lines of argument will meet with a recep-
tive ear on judicial review. And, by extension, when government coun-
sel advise their agencies as to what actions to take in the first place, they
need to know what issues they will need to address if required to defend
these actions on appeal.
I doubt that the Zaring-Pierce proposal should be interpreted as dis-
couraging the development of case law delimiting the "breadth" of judi-
cial review. Surely, the legitimacy of appellate review would not be
enhanced if courts were to hand down judgments as to whether particu-
lar agency actions were "reasonable," making no reference to past cases
in which the terms of that inquiry have acquired shape and nuance.
Indeed, if the Court were to announce that henceforth the sole test of the
validity of an agency action is "reasonableness" (or if Congress were to
amend the APA accordingly), it is hardly likely that litigants would
cease to rely on or distinguish past cases in their briefs, nor that judges
would ignore these authorities in their written decisions.
The reader might disagree with my conclusions regarding the pre-
cise issue that divided the majority and dissenters in Fox.97 At a more
general level, however, discussion and analysis of the breadth of judicial
review of the merits of agency action should continue. This essay has
aspired to make a worthwhile contribution to that enterprise.
96. As I suggested in the preceding section, notwithstanding my support for a relatively
relaxed doctrine of administrative stare decisis, I do not intend to cast doubt on the benefits of
judicial stare decisis.
97. Professor Murphy has a different assessment of this issue and the Fox case. Less
sympathetic toward agency actions that appear to be influenced by political considerations, he
urges courts to approach such actions with a skeptical "mood." Richard W. Murphy, Politics and
Policy Change in American Administrative Law, 28 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665437.
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